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MORALITY, ETHICS AND ACCOUNTING’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC ROLE IN THE 
CONTROL AND MITIGATING OF CORRUPTION 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Control and containment of corruption, one of Accounting’s more important roles in society, 
is fraught with difficulties and temptations that put accountants at risk of being sidetracked, 
confused or (worse yet) corrupted. As Lambsdorff & Schramm (2005, p.1) assert: 
“...the world is not short of ideas on how to tackle corruption. While good intentions abound we 
currently know little about their likely success” 
This paper evaluates what accountants can and should do about corruption. The limited 
success of previous research in this area likely arises from three main factors—that research: 
• Started from the most common definition of corruption as “the misuse of power or public 
office for a private gain or interest”, rather than searching for a first-principles definition, 
• Presumed that corruption is always wrong and focused on what accounting can do about 
it, rather than considering socio-economic and moral aspects of corruption so as to 
expand the research scope to what accounting can and should do about corruption, and 
• Further limited its scope to the supply-side of corruption (e.g. developing strategies to 
raise the overall cost of being corrupt) rather than considering both the supply-and the 
demand-side of corruption. 
This paper draws from an earlier study on corruption’s socio-economic and moral aspects to 
redefine it as the tort “harm arising from a breach of an owed a duty of care” (Alzadjali, 
2009a). That definition: 
• Eases difficulties in proving the existence of corruption,  
• Directs the search for perpetrators and victims of corruption and suggests the appropriate 
restitution, 
• Enables ex-post controls by creating significant financial risks for the corrupt, and 
• Provides insights on the creation of cost-effective ex-ante controls. 
While a strong moral-and-ethical case can be made that society should limit, mitigate, or 
where possible, eradicate corruption, the intent of this paper is to work from a clear and 
useful definition of corruption to develop practical and viable means for accountants to work 
via the law and other authorities to contain and control the blight of corruption. 
2.0 MORAL AND ETHICAL DIMENSIONS 
Morality and ethics have historically contributed greatly to the corruption-control strategies 
of Accounting. These controls have usually been accreted in successive layers of regulation 
and controls—with new layers being added when and as new corruption-driven outrages high 
-lighted failings in the extant controls. Typically, these controls impair efficiency, but when 
and as they are (in turn) shown to be subject to circumvention, they are added to rather than 
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replaced. As all controls ultimately fail, there is usually a deep succession of controls with 
most adding little or no value.  Thus, a major cost of corruption is the inefficiency imposed 
on society by the vast and ever growing morass of rules, regulations, controls and norms 
established to contain and control corruption but never quite succeeding. If a magic-bullet 
was found for corruption, the resulting rise in trust and fall in transaction costs would likely 
spawn a socio-economic-and-cultural Renaissance that could free most of humanity from the 
spectres of hunger, poverty, and privation.  
The interest in morality and ethics as a potential source of a magic-bullet for corruption is 
evidenced by a rising number of academic studies.  However, the subjectivity associated with 
morality and ethics tend to cause such studies to be fuzzy and inconclusive, at best. Many 
organisations seek to ease this subjectivity by codifying what is moral and ethical behaviour. 
However, as Davies (1991; per Andrew, 1998) notes: these codes tend to be widely ignored 
in their own organisation, are rarely enforced to any degree or consistency, and almost never 
influence the actions and choices of corporate decision makers. Such revealed preference 
strongly suggests that morality-and-ethics codes are established more for public relations and 
display, than for any real, sustained-use as a guide, boundary, constraint, or control on 
organisation thinking, decisions, and actions. 
As far back as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, morality was authoritative in judging 
if an action was right or wrong and ethics has long been associated with assessing the nature 
of individuals. Thus, morality and ethics combine to form the core of how many individuals 
perceive, interpret, and judge their own behaviour and actions. Shared morality and ethics 
foster and encourage the many different human values that form any given culture. Thus, any 
attempt to fight corruption, via morality and ethics, is likely to be deflected by serious issues 
relating to individual and cultural values.  For example, one of many attempts to define the 
nature of Thai corruption focused on the perceptions and experiences of public officials; that 
study highlighted that most “…respondents thought corruption was part of life in Thai society 
.…. [and that bribery] was seen as customary” (Bhargava & Bolongaita, 2004, p. 174). 
Morality and ethics are intangibles that are often context sensitive and often arise from a long 
history that may not be apparent to an observer or (even) to the actual actors—as a result, 
efforts to combat corruption via morality and ethics tend to be deflected by the enormous 
difficulty and inertia of displacing extant, but often implicit, cultural values and norms. 
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Morality and ethics have been the focus in a large number of corruption studies across a wide 
array of disciplines (sociology, criminology, psychology, political science, etc) but, because 
of the aforementioned issues, these studies provide little or nothing that is not inclusive or 
indeterminate. While morality and ethics may ultimately provide a long-term way to resolve 
corruption, currently unresolved, conflicting and compounding issues confound the search for 
a workable moral-and-ethical resolution to corruption. Thus, in the short- to intermediate-
term, a workable resolution to corruption is more likely to arise from a combination of the 
more focused-and-applied accounting and law disciplines. 
While a strong moral-and-ethical case can and has been made for limiting, mitigating, and 
(where and as possible) eradicating corruption, there are currently no means to effect such 
aspirations.  Less elegant but more practical temporary means are needed, in the interim, to 
control and contain corruption, while more elegant long-term corruption-control strategies are 
developed to change attitudes and behaviour. 
Stapenhurst & Kpundeh (1999, p.8) conclude that “…curbing corruption is not merely about 
ethics and morality; it is about sound governance and the effective, efficient use of public 
resources for the public good”.  Wright & Sayed (2003), in their article “Accounting Practice 
and Theory: A Social-Institution Account”, assert that “...deviations from fairness break trust, 
increase transaction costs and, when breaches in trust become endemic …our civilization will 
lose legitimacy and then fail.” This notion is consistent with the definition, mentioned earlier, 
that corruption is a breach of duty of care. 
Accounting can, in fulfilling its other roles (e.g. providing information and organising control 
systems), implement strategies to help participants more easily prevent or resolve corruption 
by identifying and avoiding such situations, or providing exit strategies (for situations where 
corruption is foreseeable), or exposing/documenting corruption when it occurs. Accounting 
can, therefore, cost-effectively mitigate corruption via prevention (where possible) or helping 
to identify, convict, and strongly discipline culprits after corruption occurs. 
2.1 Moral and Ethical Dimensions of Corruption Resolution 
While the next section shows how trust is essential to most successful relationships, Everett 
et al. (2007, p. 521) assert in counter-point that a reduction of trust can reduce opportunities 
for corruption and suggest that eliminating subsidies, lowering trade barriers, privatising 
government assets, and minimising regulation will “...unambiguously reduce opportunities 
for corruption”. However, corruption in these examples is less a matter of trust gone-wrong 
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and more an example of the old Roman adage “quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (i.e. who will 
guard the guards themselves; Juvenal, a Roman satirist, 55-127 CE). This is a common 
issue—e.g. the police have a duty protect the public and catch criminals, but there is a risk 
they will use their authority to become criminal, so the police have an internal-affairs 
department, who may be tempted by corruption, and so forth. Thus, the only effective way to 
reduce the opportunity for corruption is to attack corruption at its root. However, as Thoreau 
(1854, p. 80) noted: “There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is 
striking at the root…” 
 In a variant of the above issue Sterling, (1971, p.34 and 1975) asserts that accountants 
conceive of “…issues in such a way that they in principle are unresolvable [and, as a result,] 
… move from one unresolved issue to another, while the stock of unresolved issues continues 
to increase.” Accounting, in developing a resolution to corruption, should recognize that the 
needs of the direct and indirect victims of corruption may differ from the general needs of 
society. It is also important to note that, as Alzadjali, et al. (2009b, p. 14) found, corruption is 
never victimless, it is “...pernicious at all levels...—there is no corruption sweet-spot”. Thus, 
any resolution of corruption must not only contain and control it, but also inform its victims 
in such a way as to assist them in demanding and winning compensation. 
Everett et al. (2007) suggest that to precisely address corruption, we should consider three 
broad categories of solution: control, exit, and voice. The definition of corruption used in this 
paper, considers these possible strategies so as to provide accountants with more control and 
information to make better judgments.  In addition, it helps provide an appropriate exit from 
corrupt situations, and enables victims (individual and/or groups) to voice their losses and 
needs so as to claim restitution from those who have harmed them and/or otherwise failed to 
discharge a legitimate duty of care. A large part of the corruption controls will be embedded 
in written or implied legal and social contracts that explicitly state what duties of care are 
owed, by whom and to whom. The greatest harm to society from corruption is not in what is 
stolen (i.e. in economic terms, it merely transfers value and, thus, nets to a zero-sum game), 
but rather in what is destroyed and trust is one of the greatest values destroyed by corruption. 
As by Zaghloul & Hartman (2003) note: “[in] the absence of trust in business relationships .... 
[there] is significant need for a good and powerful control system to mange and administrate 
the contracting process”.  An additional significant advantage of inherent or enforced trust is 
that it greatly reduces information and transaction costs and, thus, significantly reduces the 
cost of doing business. 
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3.0 TRUST VS. TRANSACTION COST 
Trust between parties helps to minimize information and transaction costs in most situations 
(Akerlof, 1970).  Mistrust adds to costs in several ways, including (as Zaghloul & Hartman, 
2003, note): 
• Uncertainty of work conditions, 
• Delaying events, 
• Indemnification, 
• Liquidated damages, and 
• Excessive documentation.   
The effect of the trust-to-mistrust continuum on transaction costs are illustrated in Figure 1. 
                  Figure 1: The Effect of the Trust-to-Mistrust Gradient on Transaction Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main points drawn from Figure 1 are: 
1. Trust reduces transaction costs – As trust declines, transaction costs rise exponentially 
and approach infinity as trust approaches nil. Actual or potential corruption makes it 
difficult and/or unwise to sustain trust.  
2. Accounting and a trustworthy legal system complement or enhance trust – This causes 
the transaction-cost curve to rotate downward and even allows transactions to occur where a 
minor degree of mistrust exists. However, as shown in Figure 1, mistrust imposes serious 
costs on business and makes transactions too costly where the mistrust is high. 
3. If high and certain cost are imposed on trust breakers, transactions are viable even 
with great mistrust – This situation can occur where there is effective accounting and law 
(i.e. contract enforcement via a trusted, effective, efficient and timely legal system) or by 
brutal extra-legal systems. However, in the later case, the enforcement system must be both 
feared and trusted—which may explain why organised-crime groups tend to have codes and 
neo-feudal systems of inter-locking entitlements and cross-obligations. 
While both legal and extra-legal (organised crime) approaches can reduce transaction costs to 
where transactions are viable even if there is great mistrust, Figures 2 and 3 show that extra-
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legal approaches to enforcing contracts in highly corrupt societies tend to be associated with a 
huge increase in violence and a significant reduction in subjective well being. 
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Figure 2: Violent Death Rate as a Function of the Corruption Rate
Source: TI (2008) and WHO (2004; all forms of violent death, except suicide)  
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Thus, extra-legal approaches to managing corruption do not resolve it, but merely change its 
form and shift its costs to different victims. Ultimately, extra-legal approaches to corruption 
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compound the problem and can eventually destabilise a country, by undermining its social 
institutions and allowing violently-corrupt individuals to usurp wealth, power, and authority. 
4.0 A SOLUTION TO CORRUPTION THAT INTEGRATES ECONOMIC, LEGAL 
AND ACCOUNTING DIMENSIONS 
In a high-trust environment transaction cost are considerably lower, because trust reduces the 
perceived need for validation, cross-checks, and documentation.  Dyer & Chu (2003) support 
this notion in their study on the role of trust in transactions. As previously noted, transaction 
costs rise dramatically as trust declines and trade eventually becomes non-viable unless trust 
can either be re-established, or complemented, or replaced by other factors. 
The operating and enforcement of a trustworthy legal system are negligible, in comparison to 
the rise in transaction costs imposed by a lack of trust or the violence and socially corrupting 
effects of extra-legal approaches to resolving a lack of trust. As Williamson (1979) notes: 
“...agreements and contracts can be best and almost costlessly enforced within the legal 
system”.  However, the main issue regarding the legal system is only rarely its existence or its 
cost—most nations have a legal system, however, many are ineffective because they are seen 
as corrupt, less-than competent, too slow, and/or generally untrustworthy. Thus, the legal 
systems of many countries have become so entangled in corruption that they are no longer a 
viable solution. Such legal systems need to be reformed and made cost-effective, impartial, 
timely and trustworthy. Tyler (1990) argues that people respect the law because they believe 
that the justice system is fair and that they have been and will be treated fairly. The key to 
less corruption (and more trust) then, is an effective system of property rights and the rule of 
law (Lambsdorff, 1999; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Treisman, 2000). It is an interesting 
issue—are trusting societies, as Uslaner (2004, p.2) concludes, less corrupt or are less corrupt 
societies more able to trust?  
4.1 Defining Corruption to Facilitate Control, Exit, and Voice 
Corruption, despite many earlier definitions, is not about private gain. Specifically: “There is 
nothing wrong in making partial decisions in return for favours on the grounds that it harms 
nobody” (Amos, 1982). Corruption tends to be so twisted, convoluted, and confused that the 
struggle against it needs to be clearly focused around a definition that is general and 
unambiguous. As noted previously, this study suggests that the notion of a tort provides such 
a definition. Corruption, as a tort, balances on three legs where all three must all stand, for a 
situation or action to be deemed corrupt. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 4, an accusation 
of corruption requires proof that: 
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a) A duty of care existed, 
b) The duty of care was breached, and  
c) Harm arose from the breached duty of care. 
                     Figure 4: Illustration of Corruption as a Tort Standing on Three Legs 
 
The first two legs, in Figure 4, involve proving or disproving simple questions of fact (i.e. a 
duty either exists or does not and, if a duty exits, it was either honoured or breached). A few 
researchers suggest that small levels of corruption are harmless and may even benefit society 
by working around bureaucratic blockages to economic growth (Yoshihara, 1988). However, 
such claims are hotly disputed by most researchers and are irrelevant to the tort approach to 
corruption. Specifically, the third leg of the corruption tort is proof of harm. Thus, proof of 
corruption requires that all three legs be present and those three legs identify the perpetrator 
of corruption, the victim and the quantum of harm (i.e. the estimated of the amount of harm). 
If any of these items is unproven, there is no corruption. Essentially, the focus in corruption is 
all about harm occurring where there was reason to expect care and while unwarranted gain 
may be the intent of corruption, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to prove corruption. 
The violated duty of care is what emotes the perception of corruption as being heinous and 
such outrage often fuels strident demands for legal action and retribution. However, defining 
corruption as a criminal offence is a red herring—all corruption is a social wrong that needs 
redress, but only a few variants of corruption are legislated into being criminal acts and proof 
of criminal corruption requires (in countries with an English-based jurisprudence) evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt (usually seen as ≥ 95 percent confidence) of criminal intent—a 
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claim of stupidity is often a low-cost but sufficient defence against charges of criminal 
corruption. A tort civil-lawsuit requires only a probable level of evidence (usually seen as 50 
plus percent confidence) and (except for prison) offers a wider array of remedies. Thus, a tort 
approach to resolving corruption offers retribution and restitution in the form of damages and 
it is important to note that damages from corruption often exceed what the perpetrator gained, 
by a factor of five—so civil convictions for corruption will be easier to achieve, be cost-
effective, and may bankrupt those who are convicted. As a side benefit, in a situation like that 
of the Enron fraud, hundreds of employees could tried, convicted, and punished—rather than 
only the top few. Thus, the cost of participating in organizations committing fraud would rise 
to a point of being an untenable risk. 
A weakness common to both criminal and civil systems of law is that victims need to become 
aware they have been harmed before they can argue for restitution and then evidence must be 
gathered on the nature and extent of the harm. Thus, anti-corruption legislation needs to be 
written so as to make substantiation of the offence, perpetrator, and harm easy to perform. 
A new class of legislation and declarations of fundamental human, social, and environmental 
rights, appear to be seeking to explicitly induce a general acknowledgment that most social 
harm associated with business arises via corporate breach-of-a-duty-of-care torts. And, (as 
part of this acknowledgment) venues are being created for those harmed by such torts to seek 
redress from those benefiting from that harm. In the absence of a rigorous system of Social 
Responsibility Accounting, (e.g. an unambiguous statement of obligations, clear performance 
criteria, effective means of validation, and harsh and certain consequences for defalcation), 
Corporate and Individual Social Responsibility merely add another venue for corruption.  
Social Responsibility Accounting can be ordered into what Everett et al. (2007) have called: 
control, exit, and voice—where: 
• Control involves traditional accounting methods and approaches to prevent or detect 
defalcations like corruption—this stage provides a statement of responsibility and 
evidence of due diligence in completing a duty of care, 
• Exit involves gathering and providing information so that individuals and organisations 
can identify situations that are corrupt or risky and either avoid them or exit from them 
before harm occurs, and 
• Voice involves providing individuals and organisations with the information they need to 
give voice to either the harm that they or other have experienced from those who have 
failed in their duty of care or to prove that they have completed their duty of care with 
due diligence. 
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The beauty of the tort approach to corruption is that it makes intent irrelevant—what counts 
are obligations, outcomes, and a defendant having to prove due diligence if a contracted 
intent was not achieved (NB: a contract in this case might be an actual contract, a social 
contract or a legislated contact inferred by social norms or legislated corporate and individual 
social responsibility). Thus, the onus of proof for harm and that there was a breach of a duty 
of care should rest with the plaintiff and the onus of proving a due diligence should rest with 
the defendant. 
Accountants are well positioned to develop appropriate reporting and controls for Corporate 
and Individual Social Responsibility—the accounting professional associations provide a 
clear statement and guideline of the responsibility and ethics of accountants, accountants are 
required to report annually on how they have kept their knowledge current via professional 
development, and accounting clients can file a complaint with and/or ask for arbitration from 
the association if they feel that an accountant has not been professional and/or otherwise 
failed to diligently discharge their duties. 
CONCLUSION 
Corruption has plagued and impoverished humanity since time immemorial. Mountains of 
research and sermons have been written and presented to condemn corruption and to seek a 
solution, but have changed little. Accounting has for millennia sought to contain and control 
corruption, but the corrupt gather wealth, power and authority and use those means to corrupt 
and subvert the systems and processes setup to fight corruption. Corruption is an enormous 
drag on society that destroys far more wealth than what is gathered by the corrupt. This study 
found that, while corruption can be soundly condemned on moral and ethical grounds, those 
grounds are too culturally and context sensitive to provide an unambiguous paradigm from 
which to fight corruption. 
This study suggests that tort law be used in civil courts to fight corruption. After legislation 
firmly establishes the nature and context of a duty of care—precedence in case law will soon 
fill in the details of who owes what to whom and will keep that process up-to-date. The risk 
of lawsuits is likely to have a salutary effect on those who might be tempted to seek benefit 
from corruption. Accounting will need to develop Social Responsibility Accounting to keep 
the system fair, reasonable, and relatively free from frivolous and vexatious tort lawsuits.    
Social Responsibility Accounting will require a clear accounting of who owes what duty to 
whom and what constitutes due diligence in fulfilling those duties. That accounting will be 
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arise from the activities of control, exit, and voice—voice is the most important of those 
activities, because it enables and empowers victims of corruption to denounce and to seek 
restitution from those who betrayed their trust. However, this process will not work unless the 
courts are seen as cost-effective, impartial, timely and trustworthy.  
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